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INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys recent legislation and caselaw affecting
professional athletes, focusing in particular on the tax consequences to professional hockey players. Much of the discussion,
however, is also applicable to other athletes and foreigners working
in the United States.
The issues of income allocations, income re-allocations, and
central withholding agreements are treated extensively. In the area
of income allocation, a clear understanding of how courts apply the
"time basis" formula to the income determination of a foreign athlete is essential so that proper planning at the time of contract
negotiations can result in minimal U.S. tax liability. The Tax
Court's recent decision on how income should be re-allocated between an athlete and his personal service corporation demonstrates
that income re-allocation is significantly affected by whether an
athlete plays a team sport.' Finally, this Article discusses how cen*

Lloyd E. Shefsky is a member of the law firm of Shefsky & Froelich Ltd., Chicago,

Illinois.
** Mr. Pappano is an associate at Shefsky & Froelich Ltd., Chicago, Illinois.
1. After the preparation of this Article, this Tax Court case was reversed on appeal.
An analysis of this appellate opinion is provided in the appendix to this Article.
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tral withholding agreements can reduce rates of withholding, and
how recent announcements in this area could prove beneficial to
nonresident alien athletes, entertainers, and other similarly-situated individuals.
II.

INCOME ALLOCATION: THE FAVELL CASE

Americans take great pride in the ability and development of
their professional athletes. Yet in the sport of hockey, they often
look to Canada, their contiguous northern neighbor, for a supply of
professional hockey players. Thus, a large number of Canadian
players often become entangled in the web of the Internal Revenue
Code 2 rules that apply to nonresident aliens conducting a trade or
business in the United States. While these foreign athletes live in
the glory of their sport, they face tax issues similar to those faced
by any self-employed individual.3 Additionally, these athletes encounter tax issues unique to professional hockey players.
The consolidated cases that comprise Favell v. United States4
present an example of the complex rules encountered by a professional hockey player attempting to compute gross taxable income
in the United States. This case is part of an odyssey in which over
197 tax refund cases were filed by professional hockey players.'
A. Background
The plaintiffs, Douglas R. Favell, Jr., Gilles Marotte, Frederick E. Speck, Francis W. Speer, and Garnet E. Bailey, represent a
sample of 197 cases filed on behalf of professional hockey players
claiming an overpayment of taxes.6 In 1979, the Court of Claims
2. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1986, as
amended, unless otherwise indicated.
3. Courts have recognized that professional hockey is a business. See Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Pa.
1972) ("hockey is primarily a multi-state, bi-national business, where the fundamental motive is the making of money....
Despite the thousands of words uttered . . . about the
glory of the sport of hockey and the grandeur of its superstars, the basic factors here are not
the sheer exhilaration from observing the speeding puck, but rather the desire to maximize
the available buck.") (emphasis added).
4. 89-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 87,711 (1989).
5. These cases were originally filed before the predecessor of the United States Claims
Court, the United States Court of Claims, on December 20, 1976. Id. Subsequent to the
enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25,
the United States Claims Court inherited cases pending before the United States Court of
Claims, including these five cases. Favell, 89-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,711. See infra note 6 and
accompanying text.
6. Id. This larger group of cases has been referred to as the "hockey player tax refund
cases." Id.
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ordered consolidation of these five cases for purposes of trial.7 The
remaining 192 hockey-player tax cases were suspended until the
present five cases were decided. 8 The five cases were chosen as
"test-cases" or "representative cases" because they typified the
factual bases for the legal issues involved in all of the hockey
player tax refund cases." Because the five plaintiffs "seemed unprepared to work together for purposes of the scheduled trial,"' 0
Judge Phillip R. Miller ordered them to file a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the following issue: "[W]hether, as a matter of law,
plaintiffs, who are non-resident aliens, are entitled to exclude from
the United States tax liability proportionate income payments allegedly attributable to activities in which they took part during the
off-season in Canada (the income allocation issue).""
The Favell court began its discussion by explaining that a professional hockey player's year can be divided into four periods: (1)
training camp; (2) regularly scheduled championship games, which
generally begin in the first or second week of October and end in
April; (3) play-off or Cup games; and (4) the off-season, starting at
the close of the competitive playing season and ending with the
first day of training camp. 1 2 The court described these distinct intervals as follows:
Training camp normally commences thirty days prior to the beginning of regularly scheduled championship games, which begin
in October of each year. The training camp period is used by
each hockey club's coaching staff to form a 'line' which consists
of the club's superior players and those players who perform
best as a team. Training camp is not used to train or to give
individual players thirty days to achieve the best possible physical condition. As required by the terms of the Standard Player's
Contracts signed by the players, players are required to arrive at
training camp in top physical condition and to be ready to compete for 'line' positions. Furthermore, the players must maintain
7. Id. at 87,712. The trial was to take place in Canada in the spring of 1985. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.

10. Id.
11. Id. at 87,711. The income allocation issue had already been addressed by the
courts. See Stemkowski v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 252 (1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded, 690 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1982); Hanna v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 252 (1981), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 763 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs in both
Stemkowski and Hanna lost on the income allocation issue. Favell, 89-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,712
n.4. Although this issue was previously addressed by the courts, the Favell plaintiffs felt
that the hockey players in the earlier cases had lost the income allocation issue on appeal
due to a lack of evidence in the trial court record. Id. at 87,712.
12. Id. at 87,713.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1991

3

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
74

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:71

that excellent physical condition throughout the season. The
regularly scheduled league championship games are the regular
season games in which the hockey teams compete for play-off
positions. The Cup games consist of the play-off games in which
the select hockey teams compete to determine which team is the
best in the league. The off-season is the period of time between
the regular season or play-off games and training camp in which
hockey players do not play competitive professional hockey.
plaintiffs in these
During the off-season, the players, who are
13
cases, returned to their homes in Canada.

Each Favell plaintiff was a nonresident alien of the United
States, receiving compensation from sources within the United
States, for labor and personal services rendered while playing for
their hockey clubs.' Each player also signed a standard player's
contract covering a one-year period. 15
B.

The Income Allocation Issue

The specific issue before the court was whether, in accordance
with Treasury Regulation section 1.861-4(b),' 6 the plaintiff hockey
players, who had nonresident alien tax status, should be allowed to
exclude from United States taxable income for the tax years in
question, that portion of salaries for alleged contractual services
7
performed outside the United States during the off-season.
In order to answer this issue, the court was required to determine, as a matter of law, whether conditioning programs, fitness
exercises, and similar activities in which plaintiffs participated
outside the United States during the off-season should be viewed
13. Id. at 87,714.
14. Id.
15. Id. Each of the plaintiffs had signed a National Hockey League Standard Player's
Contract during at least one of the tax years in question. Id. Plaintiff Frederick Speck also
signed a World Hockey Association Uniform Player's Contract, and Francis Speer signed an
American Hockey League Standard Player's Contract. Id. at 87,718-19. The Claims Court
determined that all these contracts were, in relevant parts, substantially the same. Id. at
87,714-19.
16. Tress. Reg. § 1.861-4(b) (1969). Treasury regulations refer to regulations promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code and were in effect during the Favell litigation.
17. Favell, 89-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,720. The court noted that, on the motion and crossmotion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs and the defendant both framed the
issue "somewhat differently." Id. The plaintiffs stated the issue as whether they were "entitled to the exclusion on the time basis pursuant to Regulation Section 1.861-4(b)-2 [Treas.
Reg. § 1.861.4(b) (1969)] for services performed in Canada as a matter of law because their
contracts expressly state[d] [they were to be] compensated for such services." Id. at 87,720
n.12. The defendant articulated the issue as "[wihether the salary received by professional
hockey players under standard player's contracts was paid, in part, for labor or services
performed during the off-season." Id.
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as contractual conditions, or labor and services required to be performed under the contracts at issue. 18 Because they were nonresident aliens who rendered services both within and outside the
United States, "plaintiffs [were] subject to United States federal
income tax only on that portion of their income properly attributable to the conduct of a trade or business (including the performance of personal services) performed within the United States."' 9
The Treasury Regulations provided that when labor or services
were performed properly within and outside the United States, the
amount to be included in the gross income was determined by an
apportionment based on the number of days of labor or service
performed within the United States. 20 Because courts have confronted this issue on numerous occasions, 2 ' it is commonly referred
to as the "income allocation" issue. The mathematical determination of the allocation of income in accordance with the regulations
is known as the "time basis" formula.22 The time basis formula
multiplies compensation by a fraction; the numerator is the number of days of performance of services within the United States,
and the denominator is the total number of days of performance of
services for which compensation is received.2 The controversy at
18. Id. at 87,720.
19. Id. at 87,722. See 26 U.S.C. § 861(a) (1954).
20. Treasury Regulation § 1.861-4(b)(2) provides as follows:
If a specific amount is paid for labor or personal services performed in the
United States, that amount (if income from sources within the United States)
shall be included in the gross income. If no accurate allocation or segregation of
compensation for labor or personal services performed in the United States can
be made, or when such labor or service is performed partly within and partly
without the United States, the amount to be included in the gross income shall
be determined by an apportionment on the time basis; that is, there shall be
included in the gross income an amount which bears the same relation to the
total compensation as the number of days of performance of the labor or services
within the United States bears to the total number of days of performance of
labor or services for which the payment is made.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b) (1969).
21. See supra note 11.
22. Favell, 89-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,722. The "time basis" formula can be expressed as
follows:
Number of days of
performance of services
within the United States
Total number of days of
performance of services
for which hockey player
is compensated

X

Total
contract
compensation

=

Amount included in
United States taxable
income

Id.
23.

See supra note 20.
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issue in Favell focused on the correct number to be used as the
time basis formula's denominator-the total number of days of
performance of labor or services for which the plaintiffs received
their salaries under the relevant contracts. The plaintiffs claimed
that they were paid compensation for "services performed
throughout the entire [twelve] month year (including the off-season), and the proper denominator [was] thus 365 days."24 The rationale for the plaintiffs' position was that each plaintiff, during
the off-season, was contractually bound to do various things, such
as maintaining physical fitness sufficient to report to training camp
in "good physical condition," to participate in promotional activities, and to refrain from engaging in certain activities involving
contact sports or improper conduct.2 5 Therefore, the plaintiffs asserted they were acting under the terms of the contract each day of
the year.
Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed that under the time basis
formula, they were entitled, as nonresident aliens, "to apportion
their salaries on an annual basis and thus exclude from United
States taxable income, income earned during the time activities
were performed outside the United States, including any services
performed during the off-season." 2 The government countered
with the argument that even if the plaintiffs "assumed obligations
or responsibilities which extended into the off-season, such duties
were conditions of employment for which no compensation was to
be paid.

'2 7

The plaintiffs relied upon two factors to establish their case:
off-season mandatory conditioning programs and off-season hockey
club supervision or control over their time and activities.2 These
factors evidenced that they were paid each and every day of the
year. The government argued that the contract provisions requiring that hockey players "arrive in training camp in good physical
condition should be read as a condition of each contract, not as a
promise to perform services for the benefit of the hockey club during the off-season. '29 Therefore, the contemplated contractual service term did not include the off-season because the players' contractual salaries were not intended as compensation for off-season
24. Favell, 89-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,723.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 87,724.
27. Id.
28. Id. The plaintiffs submitted that these activities were intended to be compensated
contractual services under the Standard Player's Contract. Id.
29. Id.
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preparation for contract performance while players lived outside
the United States."0
C.

The Court's Reasoning

The Favell court stated the issue as follows: "[W]hether or not
the Standard Player's Contracts at issue compensate the hockey
player for off-season activities, which would in turn allow the offseason period to be included in the time basis or income allocation
formula and thereby reduce the hockey player's gross taxable
United States income."'" The court noted that general principles
of contract interpretation demanded that when interpreting a
promise or agreement, that interpretation or agreement which
gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all the terms is
preferred to an unreasonable or unlawful interpretation without effect.32 Furthermore, "[u]nder recognized rules of contract interpretation, words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. ' ' s
Finally, "the provisions of a contract must be construed so as to
effectuate the spirit and purpose the [sic] contract . . and interpreted so as to harmonize and give meaning to all its provisions. '' s
The Standard Player's Contracts at issue, covering twelvemonth periods, specified that hockey players were to be paid certain salaries.3 5 The contracts also provided that if the players were
not in good physical condition, thereby rendering them unfit to
play hockey at the commencement of the season, the Club had the
right to suspend them without pay." Additionally, these agreements provided that if the player was not employed by the Club
30. Id.
31. Id. at 87,725.
32. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1981)).
33. Id. at 87,727 (quoting Tester Corp. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 370, 373 (1982)).
34. Id. (quoting Thanet Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 629, 633, 219 Cl. Ct. 75, 82
(Ct. Cl. 1979)).
35. Id. at 87,726.
36. Id. The relevant provision of the Standard Player's Contract is as follows:
The Club may from time to time during the continuance of this contract establish rules governing the conduct and conditioning of the Player, and such rules
shall form part of this contract as fully as if herein written. For violation of any
such rules or for any conduct impairing the thorough and faithful discharge of
the duties incumbent upon the Player, the Club may impose a reasonable fine
upon the player and deduct the amount thereof from any money due to the
Player. The Club may also suspend the Player for violation of any such rules.
When the Player is fined or suspended he shall be given notice in writing stating
the amount of the fine and/or the duration of the suspension and the reason
therefore.
Id. at 87,715.
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for the entire regular season, the contract salary would be prorated "based upon the ratio of the number of days he was so employed to the total number of days in the league championship
schedule. ' 37 There would be no specific allocations attributable to
the total salary compensation. 8
The Favell court differentiated between contractual promises
and contractual conditions:
Contract promises and conditions are both means by which the
parties to a contract bring about certain desired actions of another party. A contractual condition is to be distinguished from
a promise, obligation, or covenant in that a condition creates no
right or duty in and of itself, but merely acts as a limiting or
modifying contract provision. 'A condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due.' If a
condition does not occur, whether through breach or other
cause, the party fails to meet the condition, and acquires no
right to enforce the promise. A contractual promise or obligation, on the other hand, raises a duty to perform a service and
its breach subjects the promisor to liability and damages, but
does not necessarily excuse performance by the other contracting party.3 9
The court pointed out that, under the Standard Player's Contract,
the signing player promised to report to training camp in "good
physical condition. ' 40 Failure by the player to report to training
37. Id. at 87,726. The Standard Player's Contract compensation provision reads, in
pertinent part:
Payment of [agreed upon] salary shall be in consecutive semi-monthly instalments [sic] following the commencement of the regular League Championship
Schedule of games or following the date of reporting, whichever is later; provided, however, that if the player is not in the employ of the Club for the whole
period of the Club's games in the National Hockey League Championship
Schedule, then he shall receive only part of the salary in the ratio of the number
of days of actual employment to the number of days of the League Championship Schedule of games.
Id. at 87,714.
38. Id. at 87,726.
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id. The relevant provision of the Standard Player's Contract reads as follows:
The Player ... agrees,

(a) to report to the Club training camp at the time and place fixed by the Club,
in good physical condition,
(b) to keep himself in good physical condition at all times during the season,
(c) to give his best services and loyalty to the Club and to play hockey only for
the Club unless his contract is released, assigned, exchanged or loaned by the
Club,
(d) to co-operate with the Club and participate in any and all promotional activ-
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camp would result in a material breach of the contract by the
player. 41 A failure to fulfill the condition of fitness, however, would
be tantamount to the non-occurrence of an event, which would
give the hockey club the option to excuse the occurrence, terminate the contract, fine and/or suspend the player, or simply not
2
fulfill the Club's obligation to renew the contract.
The court then engaged in an analysis of punctuation regarding the relevant contractual clauses and concluded that the obligation of the player to arrive "in good physical condition" was a condition, not a promise. s In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of the
National Hockey League Standard Player's Contract, the hockey
player agreed "to report to the club training camp at the time and
place fixed by the club, in good physical condition." 44 The Favell
court explained:
A plain reading of this contract clause and specifically focusing
on the punctuation of the clause, could only lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the words 'in good physical condition'
modify the remainder of the clause, 'to report to the Club training camp at the time and place fixed by the Club,' and describe
the condition placed upon the hockey player upon arrival at the
training camp. 4
The words "in good physical condition," set off from the remainder
of the paragraph by use of a comma before the word "in," indicated that when reading paragraph 2(a) as a whole, reference to
the latter clause "in good physical condition" was used as a contractual condition and not as a specific obligation upon the hockey
player to perform a particular service to arrive at training camp
"in good physical condition."' 6
ities of the Club and the League which will in the opinion of the Club promote
the welfare of the Club or professional hockey generally,
(e) to conduct himself on and off the rink according to the highest standards of
honesty, morality,'fair play and sportsmanship, and to refrain from conduct detrimental to the best interests of the Club, the League or professional hockey
generally.
Id. at 87,715.
41. Id. at 87,727.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 87,715.
45. Id. at 87,727 (emphasis added).
46. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that the contract in question required their participation in off-season conditioning programs, and that such participation should be compensated contractual obligations. Id. at 87,726. The Favell court explained:
The contractual obligation placed upon the hockey player by this paragraph is
that the player must 'report' to the training camp at the fixed time arranged by
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The court noted that its conclusion that paragraph 2(a) of the
player's contract described a condition of fitness as attached to a
contractual promise was supported by other provisions of the
agreement.4 7 For example, paragraph 3 of the contract addressed
the requirement that the player be fit and in a condition to properly perform his duties.4 8 Because paragraph 2(a) requires the
player to report in "good physical condition," the court concluded
that "fitness" as referred to in paragraph 3 should be considered
"good physical condition," thereby making the latter a contractual
condition of employment.4 9 Paragraph 4 of the player's contract
gave the Club the prerogative to prescribe the player's conditioning plan. 50 The Club could impose a fine and/or suspension for the
failure to comply with the rules of conditioning because such a failure would impair "the thorough and faithful duties incumbent
upon the player" to perform. 5 The court found the only duties
this paragraph could refer to were the player's obligations to play
hockey, a duty for which good physical fitness was a condition precedent.52 The court also recognized that nowhere in the contract
itself did the contract refer to conditioning or training as a promise, obligation, or duty.53 Writing that it was "unpersuaded by
the hockey club. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, this paragraph, on its
face, obligates the player to 'report' to training camp at the prearranged time,
having fulfilled the fitness condition, 'in good physical condition.'
Id. at 87,727.
47. Id. at 87,728.
48. Id. Paragraph 3 of the Standard Player's Contract states, in relevant part:
In order that the Player shall be fit and in proper condition for the performance
of his duties as required by this contract the Player agrees to report for practice
at such time and place as the Club may designate and participate in such exhibition games as may be arranged by the Club within thirty days prior to the first
scheduled Championship game.
Id. at 87,714.
49. Id. at 87,728.
50. The full text of paragraph 4 is as follows:
The Club may from time to time during the continuance of this contract establish rules governing the conduct and conditioning of the Player, and such rules
shall form part of this contract as fully as if herein written. For violation of any
such rules or for any conduct impairing the thorough and faithful discharge of
the duties incumbent upon the Player, the Club may impose a reasonable fine
upon the Player and deduct the amount thereof from any money due or to become due to the Player. The Club may also suspend the Player for violation of
any such rules. When the Player is fined or suspended he shall be given notice in
writing stating the amount of the fine and/or the duration of the suspension and
the reason therefore.
Id. at 87,715.
51. Id. at 87,728.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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plaintiffs' position that off-season activities [were] to be compensated under the contract. . . ."" The Favell court held that the
off-season days were not part of the time basis formula's
denominator. 5
In holding that fitness was a condition of the hockey player's
employment, the Favell court expressed its adoption of the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Stemkowski v. Commissioner.5 The
Claims Court noted that the plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish
Stemkowski were based on an assertion of insufficient evidence at
the trial level in that case.57 The Claims Court disagreed with this
position, and interpreted the Second Circuit's reference to an absence of evidence as an indication that there was no evidence that
the players were compensated and required by their individual
contracts to perform any conditioning or exercise programs."
The Favell court also addressed the plaintiffs' claim that their
salaries covered a twelve-month period "because of all of the general covenants to which plaintiffs obligated themselves during the
entire period of the contracts in question."5' 9 The Claims Court
54. Id. at 87,729.
55. Id. ("Given the words of the standard form contracts themselves, a reasonable
reader must conclude that the plaintiffs were being employed, and more important, compensated for their performances as professional hockey players."). See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
56. 690 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1982). Stemkowski involved the taxability of a nonresident
alien who played professional hockey for the National Hockey League. Id. at 42. As a Canadian citizen, Stemkowski was subject to taxation in the United States on the portion of his
income associated with his performance of services in the United States, with the expenditures relating to that income subject to deduction. Id. He claimed that his contract salary
compensated him for training camp, play-off, and off-season services, and that the days he
spent in Canada during training camp, play-offs, and the off-season were applicable to the
foreign-source exclusion from income. Id. at 44, 45. The Second Circuit held that, while the
contract did not cover off-season services, "the [lower court's] finding that the contract [did]
not compensate for training camp and the play-offs as well as the regular season [was]
clearly erroneous." Id. at 45. In finding that the off-season was not covered by the contract,
the Second Circuit wrote:
During the off-season, the contract imposes no specific obligations on a player.
Stemkowski argues that the obligation to appear at training camp 'in good condition' makes off-season conditioning a contractual obligation. Fitness is not a
service performed in fulfillment of the contract but a condition of employment.
There was no evidence that Stemkowski was required to follow any mandatory
conditioning program or was under any club supervision during the off-season.
He was required to observe, if anything, only general obligations, applicable as
well throughout the year, to conduct himself with loyalty to the club and the
league and to participate only in approved promotional activities.
Id. at 46.
57. Favell, 89-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,712. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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concluded that "no universally mandatory, off-season conditioning
programs were required by the contract and. . . the contract [did]
not obligate the performance of the claimed off-season conditioning programs as asserted by the plaintiffs." 60
The lesson of Favell, Stemkowski, and Hanna6 1 is clear: if offseason training programs are going to be considered compensated
contractual obligations, the hockey player's contract must be
drafted to create an obligation upon the players to engage in specific training activities.
III. AFTER FAVELL: INCOME RE-ALLOCATION AND PERSONAL
SERVICE CORPORATIONS

A.

Sargent v. Commissioner
1. Background

In the case of the athlete playing a team sport, the United
States Tax Court in Sargent v. Commissioner 2 adopted a test for
determining whether income should be re-allocated between a corimporation and its sole service-performer that makes it virtually
63
possible for an athlete to use a personal service corporation.
Plaintiff, Gary A. Sargent, was drafted by the professional
hockey team, Los Angeles Kings, in 1976.4 Sargent then solicited
advice from an attorney regarding the potential benefits of selfincorporation." His attorney informed him that the advantages of
incorporation included increased bargaining power and the possibility of setting aside money in a pension plan.6 In 1978, Sargent
formed Chiefy-Cat, Inc., with himself as the sole shareholder, pres60. Id. In so concluding, the Favell court concurred with the Tax Court's treatment of
the issue in Stemkowski: "[N]egative covenants in the employment contracts were designed
to further the primary purpose of the contract, i.e., playing hockey." Id. (quoting Stemkowski v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 252, 298 (1981)).
61. See supra note 11.
62. 93 T.C. 572 (1989). In addition to the named plaintiffs, Gary Sargent and Janice B.
Sargent, the court consolidated the cases of Steven M. Christoff and Tami Jo Christoff.
Although the Tax Court presented and discussed the facts of all the consolidated cases, this
Article discusses only the facts relating to Sargent because of the close factual similarity of
all the consolidated cases.
63. After the preparation of this Article, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the Tax Court's decision in Sargent and rejected the "team" analysis used by the Tax
Court. A brief discussion of the Eighth Circuit's opinion is presented as an appendix to this
Article.
64. Id. at 573.
65. Id. at 574.
66. Id.
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ident, and director.6 7 He then entered into an employment contract with the corporation, wherein he "agreed to perform services
as a professional hockey player and consultant exclusively for
Chiefy-Cat for the period July 1, 1978, to June 30, 1984. ' ' 68 Sargent
also entered into a memorandum of agreement with the Northstar
Hockey Partnership (Club), wherein Chiefy-Cat agreed, among
other things, "to furnish the services of Sargent as hockey player
and consultant to the Club" in exchange for specified remunerations from the years 1978 through 1982.69 Additionally, the Club,
Chiefy-Cat, and Sargent executed an agreement in which ChiefyCat reserved the right "to cause Sargent to perform services on its
behalf and that it would cause Sargent to perform his services in
order to enable it to fulfill its contractual obligation to the Club."7
Further, Sargent guaranteed the Club the performance of all
Chiefy-Cat obligations. 7
On March 5, 1980, the Internal Revenue Service determined
that the pension plan covering Sargent was a qualified pension
plan, 2 and that Sargent was deficient in his federal income taxes."
During the years at issue, Sargent was not considered an employee
of the Club for purposes of the National Hockey League Players'
pension plan; nevertheless the Club paid Chiefy-Cat the amounts
that it would otherwise have contributed to the plan on behalf of
Sargent.7 4 The amounts at issue related to amounts paid by the
Club and subsequently contributed by Chiefy-Cat to its pension
plan on behalf of Sargent.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Under the memorandum of agreement, the Northstar Partnership agreed to
pay to Chiefy-Cat $85,000 during the 1978 playing season, $115,000 during the 1979 season,
$120,000 during the 1980 season, and $130,000 during the 1981 season. Id. Under the agreement, the Club reserved the right to sell, transfer or assign, or loan out the services of
Sargent. Id. at 577. Moreover, Sargent could not, without the Club's consent, participate in
any other athletic sport or make any public appearances or sponsorships relating to services
performed for the Club. Id.
70. Id. The scheduling of games was controlled by the Club. Id. at 577. The Club's
coach determined the strategy of play during the games, which players would play, and for
how long they would play. Id. The coach also conducted mandatory practices and ran the
training camps with the general manager's assistance. Id.
71. Id. at 574.
72. Id. The self-employment contract between Sargent and Chiefy-Cat provided that
the corporation was to pay Sargent $60,000 in the first year and $95,000 for the following
years. Id. Chiefy-Cat withheld and paid the proper federal and state taxes, employment,
and unemployment taxes. Id. During the years 1978 and 1982, Chiefy-Cat contributed a
total of $100,416 to Sargent's pension plan. Id. at 575.
73. Id. at 573.
74. Id. at 576, 77.
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The Majority Opinion

The court stated that the issue before it was the "taxability of
sums earned through the performance of personal services as between the individual who performs the services and the personal
service corporation created by that individual. ' 75 The IRS argued
that, by virtue of the common law rules for determining the existence of an employer/employee relationship, Sargent was an employee of the Club and not Chiefy-Cat, and that the amounts
which Chiefy-Cat received from the Club should be taxable to Sargent under sections 6176 or 48277 of the Internal Revenue Code. 78
Sargent argued that he was not an employee of the Club, and that
neither section 61 nor section 482 applied.7 9
In order to determine whether Chiefy-Cat or the Club was
Sargent's employer, the court used principles developed in cases
addressing whether an individual was an employee or an indepen75. Id. at 577.
76. I.R.C. § 61 (1985) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
I.R.C. § 61 (1985).
77. I.R.C. § 482 (1986) provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if
he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of
such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
78. Sargent, 93 T.C. at 578.
79. Id.
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dent contractor."s The court did not examine the legal relationship
of Sargent to his corporation, but instead focused on his relationship to the Club.s"
The court recognized that, as in the case of determining employee/independent contractor status, the issue before it was to be
resolved based on all the facts and circumstances involved.82 In
evaluating the relevant facts, the court adopted the "fundamental"
test for determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee-"whether the person for whom the work is
performed has the right to control the activities of the individuals
whose status is in issue, not only as to results but also as to the
means and method to be used for accomplishing the result."8 "
The IRS maintained that "the very nature of a hockey player's
position as a member of a team, renders impossible the relationship which petitioners seek to establish between themselves and
their corporations.""4 Sargent, however, argued that by virtue of
his talents, he retained control over how he should play in order to
accomplish the strategy developed by the coach during training
80. Id.
81. This approach is a marked departure from that employed by the Tax Court in
similar cases. For example, in Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882 (1982), aff'd, 734 F.2d
20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984), a professional basketball player, under contract with the NBA team the San Francisco Warriors, executed an additional contract with
Presentaciones Musicales, S.A. (PMSA), a Panamanian corporation. Id. at 884. In this
agreement, the player, Johnson, gave PMSA the right to his services in professional sports
for a limited time, and the corporation agreed to pay him a monthly sum. Id. Later, PMSA
licensed its rights and obligations under this agreement to EST International (EST), a British Virgin Islands limited liability company. Id. The following year Johnson executed an
Assignment of Contract Rights, wherein he assigned his contract payments from the Warriors to EST. Id. at 885. In Johnson, the Tax Court articulated the issue as "whether
amounts paid by the Warriors with respect to petitioner's services as a basketball player
[were] income to petitioner or to the corporation to which the amounts were remitted." Id.
at 889. The court stated:
Given the inherent impossibility of logical application of a per se actual earner
test, a more refined inquiry has arisen in the form of who controls the earnings
of the income. An examination of the case law . . . reveals two necessary elements before the corporation, rather than its service-performer employee, may
be considered the controller of the income. First, the service-performer employee
must be just that-an employee of the corporation whom the corporation has
the right to direct or control in some meaningful sense. Second, there must exist
between the corporation and the person or entity using the services a contract or
similar indicium recognizing the corporation's controlling position.
Id. at 891 (citations and footnotes omitted). Obviously, the two-step test outlined in Johnson was not followed in the Sargent case.
82. Sargent, 93 T.C. at 578.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 579.
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camp, practice, and actual game play.8 5 "In short, plaintiff[] contend[ed] that the same frame of reference should apply to [his]
8' 6
situation as would be applicable to a player of individual sports.
The Sargent court disagreed with this position."7 The court
determined that the nature of team sports was a "critical element
which must be taken into account in determining the existence of
an employer/employee relationship in accordance with common
law principles."8 8 Furthermore, it expressed its satisfaction with
the fact that "the nature of the team sport of hockey involve[d] a
high level of control over player activity by coaches and managers
that such control [could not] simply be ignored or disguised as
mere strategy." ' The court, therefore, held that Sargent was an
employee of the Club and not of his personal service corporation.9
Having concluded that Sargent was an employee of the Club,
the court directed its attention to the determination of whether
amounts paid to Chiefy-Cat, his personal service corporation, were
taxable to him by virtue of sections 61 and 482 of the Internal
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 580. As the Sargent dissent indicated, this position is difficult to understand
in light of the Johnson case, in which the Tax Court assumed that a basketball player (i.e.,
a team player) could be an employee of a corporation. Id. at 584 (Wells, J., dissenting)
(citing Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, 892 (1982)). In his dissent, Judge Wells wrote:
In Johnson v. Commissioner, we considered a situation in which a professional
'team player,' more specifically, a basketball player, assigned the rights to his
services and payment therefor to certain corporations in exchange for fixed
monthly fees. In analyzing that situation, we set forth 'the two requirements
that must be met before a corporation, rather than its service-performer employee, will be considered the controller of the income and taxable thereon.'
Those requirements are:
(1) the service-performer employee must be an employee of the corporation
whom the corporation has the right to direct or control in some meaningful way;
and
(2) there must exist between the corporation and the person or entity using the
services a contract or similar indicium recognizing the corporation's controlling
position.
The majority's analysis in the instant case renders the first requirement of Johnson a nullity in the very context in which it was articulated-namely, that of
team sports. In Johnson, we assumed arguendo that a basketball player's contractual arrangement with a corporation satisfied the first requirement of Johnson, thus conveying the impression that a team player could potentially meet
such a requirement. The majority, however, without directly confronting the issue, now appears to conclude that a team player and his PSC [Personal Service
Corporation] can never, as a matter of law, satisfy the first requirement of
Johnson.
Id. at 584-85 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
90. Sargent, 93 T.C. at 580.
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Revenue Code. 1 The court distinguished other cases which recognized that a personal service corporation had a separate existence, 92 stating that those cases had no bearing on the instant case
because those cases set forth the requirements of an employer/employee relationship between the taxpayer and his personal service
corporation and assumed the existence of such a relationship.93
The court also dismissed any congressional intention to bestow
benefits on qualified retirement plans, as such reasoning applied
only to the distinguished cases.9 4
In sum, the Sargent court concluded that "the instant case
[was] a classic situation for the application of the assignment of
income doctrine. . . and that the amounts received by Chiefy-Cat
. . .for services rendered. . . to the Club should be includable in
[Sargent's] income under section 61."19
3.

The Dissent

In a strident dissent to the Tax Court's opinion, Judge Wells
argued that the majority "brushed aside" the traditional test of
determining when income should be re-allocated from a personal
service corporation to its sole service-performer. 6 Judge Wells
wrote:
The majority disregards the separateness of the PSC's by analyzing the issue in the framework of whether petitioners are
'common-law employees' of the Club. Even though the agreements in the instant case were apparently the subject of armslength negotiations, the majority fails to analyze whether, under
those agreements, the Club gave up its right to 'common-law'
control of the petitioners. Indeed, it appears that the Club
agreed to deal with petitioners only pursuant to the contractual
arrangements provided under the agreements. Although the ma91. Id. at 581. See supra notes 76-77.
92. Id. at 582. The Sargent court discussed that, in Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1014 (1981), aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983), it had held:
[W]here the personal service corporation had a recognized separate existence
and there were clearly established and observed arrangements between the entities and individual involved, the entire income of that corporation could not be
allocated to the taxpayer-shareholder, even though the purpose of forming the
corporation was to obtain tax benefits, such as the ability to make contributions
to a pension plan.
Sargent, 93 T.C. at 582.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 583.
96. Id. at 584 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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jority purports to decide merely whether petitioners were the
'employees' of their PSC's, the distinction between finding that
petitioners were not the PSC's employees, and disregarding the
existence of 97the PSC entirely, is 'largely semantic rather than
substantive.'
In summary, under Sargent, it would be virtually impossible
for an athlete playing a team sport to use a personal service corporation. Fortunately, however, due to changes in the pension laws,
athletes no longer have a strong economic and retirement incentive
to make use of such corporations."8
B.

Central Withholding

In a recent Revenue Procedure enactment,9 9 the Internal Revenue Service provided instruction to nonresident alien athletes, entertainers and similarly-situated individuals regarding the procedures for requesting central withholding agreements and qualifying
for reduced rates of withholding under Treasury Regulation
1.1441-4(b)(3) of 1986.10
Section 1441(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 requires
all persons having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of certain items of income from sources within the United
States of any nonresident alien individual to deduct and withhold
from such items a withholding tax equal to thirty percent
thereof. 10 1 This requirement applies to passive as well as earned
income items including interest, dividends, rent, salaries, wages,
compensations, remunerations, and emoluments. 0 2
Treasury Regulation section 1.1441-4(b)(3), 0 3 however,
provides:
Compensation for personal services of a nonresident alien individual who is engaged during the taxable year in the conduct of
a trade or business within the United States may be wholly or
partially exempted from the withholding required by § 1.1441-1
if an agreement is reached between the Director of the Foreign
97. Id. at 587-88 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
98. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324, generally eliminated the disparity between tax-qualified corporate and tax-qualified self-employment retirement plans. See Hira, Self-Employed Retirement Plans: TEFRA
Brings Parity, But DisparitiesRemain, J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 225 (June 1984).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Rev. Proc. 89-47, 1989-2 C.B. 598.

Id.
I.R.C. § 1441(a) (1986).
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-4(b)(3) (1986).
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Operations District and the alien104individual with respect to the
amount of withholding required.
The newly enacted procedure provides that the Internal Revenue
Service will consider entering into a withholding agreement permitting withholding on projected net income at the thirty percent
rate or at a graduated rate, provided that certain requirements are
met. 0 5 In no event, however, will a central withholding agreement
reduce the amount of withheld taxes to an amount less than the
anticipated income tax liability. 0 6
Specifically, the taxpayer must submit to the IRS: (1) a list of
the nonresident aliens to be covered by the agreement; (2) copies
of all contracts 10 7 regarding terms and events to be covered by the
agreement; (3) an itinerary of dates and locations of all performances scheduled during the period to be covered by the agreement;
(4) a proposed budget containing itemized estimates including substantiation of all gross income and expenses for the period; and (5)
the name and address of a person to be contacted if additional information or documentation is required. 108 Also, the IRS must be
provided with the name, address and employer identification number of the central withholding agent. 09
According to Revenue Procedure 89-47, when the IRS approves the estimated budget and designated central withholding
agents, the Associate Chief Counsel is to prepare a withholding
agreement that must be signed by each withholding agent, each
covered alien, and the Assistant Commissioner. 0 The remainder
of the procedure is as follows:
Ordinarily, each withholding agent will be required to agree to
withhold income tax from payments to the covered alien; to pay
over the withheld tax to the Service on the dates and in the
amounts specified in the agreement; and to have the Service apply the payments of withheld tax to the withholding agent's
Form 1042 account. Each withholding agent will also be re104.
105.
106.
107.
"contracts

Id.
Rev. Proc. 89-47, 1989-2 C.B. 598.
Id.
The Revenue Procedure lists "all" contracts as including (but not limited to)
with employers, agents, and promoters; exhibition halls and the like; persons providing lodging, transportation, and advertising; and accompanying personnel such as band
members or trainers." Rev. Proc. 89-47, 1989-2 C.B. 598.
108. Id.
109. Id. A central withholding agent "receives contract payments, keeps books of account for the covered aliens, and pays expenses (including tax liabilities) of the covered
aliens during the period covered by the agreement." Id.
110. Id.
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quired to file Form 1042 and Form 1042S for each tax year in
which income is paid to a covered alien with respect to the period and events covered by the agreement. The Service will
credit the withheld tax payments, posted to the withholding
agent's Form 1042 account, in accordance with the Form 1042S.
Each covered alien must agree to file Form 1040C. 11'
While the process of obtaining a central withholding agreement
may appear to be cumbersome and time-consuming, the benefit of
reduced withholding may be well worth the effort.

111. Id.

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol8/iss1/3

20

Shefsky and Pappano: Recent Tax Issues Affecting Foreign Athletes-Playing Hockey in th
RECENT TAX ISSUES

1991]

APPENDIX

Discussion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals'
Opinion Reversing the Tax Court's Decision in
Sargent v. Commissioner
In its decision filed April 2, 1991, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in
Sargent.112 The court noted that this appeal presented a case of
first impression. 113 The court also pointed out that the decision of
the Tax Court would be reviewed under a standard of review
whereby the trial judge's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.' "
The Eighth Circuit held that Sargent was an employee of his
PSC because the PSC had the contractual right to "control" him;
whereas the Tax Court had determined that Sargent was an employee of the club and not his PSC because the club, and not the
PSC, exercised "control" over him. The court flatly rejected the
Tax Court's reasoning that because Sargent was a member of a
of
hockey "team," the requisite control over him-for purposes
11 5
taxation-was lodged in the hockey club and not in his PSC.

The court quoted Treasury Regulation Section 31.3121(d)1(c)(2) (1980) which states that, "[iun connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in
which the services are performed; it is sufficient if it has the right
to do so."'u' The appellate court rejected the Tax Court's reliance

on the "team" factor to be determinative of whether there existed
17
the control element necessary for an employment relationship.'
The appellate court pointed out that there were two requirements which must be met before the PSC rather than the servicerecipient may be considered to be the true controller of the service-provider. First, the service-provider must be an employee of
the corporation and that corporation must have the right to exercise some meaningful control. Second, there must exist between
112. 929 F.2d 1252 (1991).
113. Id. at 1253.
114. Id. at 1254.
115. The appellate court stated:
The Tax Court takes the position that because Sargent and Christoff were members of a hockey "team," the requisite control over them-for purposes of taxation-was lodged in the hockey club and not the respective PSCs, with which
they had a contractual employment relationship. We reject this contention.

Id.
116.
117.

Id. at 1256.
Id. The court stated that "[sluch an arbitrary approach is specious at best." Id.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1991

21

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
92

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:71

the PSC and the service-recipient a similar indicium recognizing
the corporation's controlling position. "'
The appellate court pointed out that the Tax Court did not
focus on this "team" element when it had previously decided
Johnson which involved a basketball player.11 9 Further, the appellate court stated that the Tax Court's "team" analysis "further
breaks down when one looks at a decision handed down by the Tax
Court just one day after the case before us."12 0 The court examined
the Tax Court's decision in Pflug v. Commissioner."' There, an
actress entered into an exclusive employment contract with her
husband's corporation. Subsequently, that corporation entered into
a contract with a major film studio, agreeing to provide the services
of Ms. Pflug for a new television series. In order to determine the
case, the Tax Court was first required to decide whether Ms. Pflug
was an employee of that corporation." 2 The court pointed out that
the Tax Court held that the contracts between the respective parties were dispositive of this issue because those contracts provided
the corporation with dominion and control over its employee, Mrs.
2
Pflug.1 3
The court stated that it was "perplexed" to find that existence
of the contractual arrangements which were dispositive of the issue
of "control" in Pflug were summarily discarded in Sargent12 4 and
that the same "team" factors which were dispositive of the issue of
118. Accordingly, within Regulation §31.3121(d)-(1)(c)(2), two necessary elements
must be met before the corporation, rather than the service-recipient, in this case the North
Stars Hockey Club, may be considered the true controller of the service-provider. First, the
service-provider must be just that-an employee of the corporation whom the corporation
has the right to direct or control on some meaningful sense. See Vnuk v. Comm'r, 621 F.2d
1318, 1320-21 (8th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 882 (1982). Second, there must
exist between the corporation and the person or entity (Club) using the services of a contract or similar indicium recognizing the corporation's controlling position. See Pacella v.
Comm'r, 78 T.C. 604 (1982); Keller v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th
Cir. 1983); Johnson, 78 T.C. 882 (1982).
119. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1256.
120. Id. at 1257.
121. 58 T.C.M. 685 (1989).
122. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1257.
123. The appellate court quoted the Tax Court which stated:
The fundamental question is whether Charwool had the right to exercise dominion and control over the activities of [Pflug], not only as to results, but also as to
the means and methods used to accomplish the result. We find, by virtue of the
contract, [Pflug] entered with Charwool, Charwool had the requisite right to
control [Pflug].
Pflug, 58 T.C.M. at 688; Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1257.
124. In fact, the Eighth Circuit pointed out that the contracts in Sargent were "of a
more bona fide nature" because those contracts were in writing, while the contracts in Pflug
were oral. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1257.
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control in Sargent were not even discussed in Pflug.'2 5 The court
reasoned that an actress is as much a part of a team "including the
case, writers, directors and producers all working toward a common goal" as a hockey player.1 2
Having disposed of the "team" analysis of control advanced by
the Tax Court, the Eighth Circuit found "ample Tax Court precedent which upholds the sanctity of contractual relations between
taxpayers and their respective personal service corporations. "127
The court pointed out that by rejecting the Tax Court's
"team" test, and by recognizing the viability of the contracts between the athletes and their personal service corporations, it had
effectively decided the only issue presented: by whom were the ap1 28
pellants employed.
The court went on to hold that "[b]y embracing the 'contract'
theory of this case, we were at the same time discarding the Tax
Court's conclusion that this case involves the "assignment of income" doctrine." '2 9 The court held that the situation in Sargent
was "clearly inapposite to the situation in Lucas v. Earl.5 0
The appellate court recognized that the assignment of income
doctrine can be overused.' 3 1 The appellate court quoted the Tax
Court which had observed in Johnson that:
125. Id.
126. The appellate court stated:
Was not Joanne Pflug a part of a team every bit as "controlled" as Sargent and
Christoff? Like a hockey team in which different players assume different roles
to insure success, the members of Pflug's team included the cast, writers, directors and producers all working toward the common goal of producing a successful TV series. More importantly, just as a hockey player has a generalized set of
plays tailored to fit his talents and the talents of his teammates, so, too, Ms.
Pflug's "plays" included movements carefully choreographed to mesh with other
case members, a script prepared for her to follow, cue cards to insure that little
or no deviation from the designed "play" occurred, and numerous retakes to
guarantee that ultimate control vested in the hands of the studio, not Ms.
Pflug's PSC. Nevertheless, the Tax Court concluded that Ms. Pflug was an employee of her PSC.
127. Id. at 1258.
128. Id.
129. The "assignment of income" doctrine was articulated in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
11 (1930), which involved a contract between a husband and wife that declared all property
which they were to receive to be taken by them as joint tenants. The husband received
salary and attorneys' fees and was the only party to the contracts by which the salary and
the fees were earned. The Supreme Court held that half of the husband's personal service
income could not, by the contract, be assigned to the wife for tax purposes. Mr. Justice
Holmes noted that the arrangement was one by which "the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." Id.
130. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1258.
131. Id. at 1259.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1991

23

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
94

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:71

However, the realities of the business world present an overly
simplistic application of Lucas v.Earl rule. Whereby the true
earner may be identified by pointing to the one actually turning
the spade or dribbling the ball. Recognition must be given to
corporations as taxable entities which, to a great extent, rely
upon the personal services of their employees to produce corporate income. Where a corporate employee performs labors which
give rise to income, it solves little merely to identify the actual
laborer. Thus, a tension has evolved between the basic tenets of
Lucas v. Earl and recognition of the nature of the corporation
business form."'2
The appellate court relied upon the language of the Supreme Court which stated that the tax advantages which properly flow from incorporation should not be questioned so long as
a corporation carries on some form of business.'" Indeed, the
appellate court pointed out that the Tax Court had voiced the
same conclusion when it stated that "the policy favoring the recognition of corporations as entities independent of their shareholders required that we not ignore the corporate form so long
as the corporation actually conducts business.113 4 The appellate
court pointed out that, in this case, there had been obvious business activity.135
Thus, in view of obvious business activity by the appellant's
PSCs, these cases are removed from that type of conduct which
is forbidden under the "assignment of income flow doctrine."'3 6
Finally, the court pointed out that the fact that "each Appellant
has taken steps to enhance his retirement through a richer corporate-sponsored pension plan is of no consequence to this
132. Id. (quoting Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890).
133. The court quoted the Supreme Court's reasoning:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life. Whether
the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of incorporation
or to avoid or comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator's
personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that business is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of the business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity. Molene Prop. Inc. v.
Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
134. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1259 (quoting the Tax Court in Keller v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.
1014, 1031 (1981)).
135. The appellate court stated:
Indeed, at no time has the Commissioner questioned the legitimacy of Appellants' corporate business activities. According to the record, both RIF and
Chiefy-Cat withheld income and employment taxes from the salary payments to
Appellants; paid contributions to the Chiefy-Cat Pension Plan and the RIF Pension Plan on account of their employment of Sargent and Christoff, respectively;
and filed corporate tax returns and paid corporate income taxes.
Id. at 1260.
136. Id.
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court.
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7

Whether the Tax Court or other circuit courts will follow
the traditional "contract" test followed by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Sargent remains to be seen. What is clear,
however, is that if a "team" analysis is adopted by a court, then
it is virtually impossible for an individual employed as a member of a team to be treated as an employee of his personal service corporation. What is also unclear is how broadly the term
"team" will be applied. For example, could other courts determine that an actress can be employed by a personal service corporation when she is a member of the "team" making the film?
Under a "contract" theory, an individual is considered employed
by his personal service corporation if there is a contract between
the service-provider and his personal service corporation giving
the corporation the right to direct or control him in some meaningful sense, and there is a contract between the personal service
corporation and the service-recipient (or similar indicium) recognizing the personal service corporation's controlling position.

137.

Id.
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